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ARGUMENT 
I. Reciprocal Discipline Is Not Limited to Sanctions of Identical or 
Lesser Severity 
Welker's Brief offers a definition of "equivalent" in support of his argument 
that the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD") limit a District Court to 
imposing equivalent or less severe discipline in cases of reciprocal discipline. 
Instead, the focus of the analysis should be on the word "reciprocal." 
The word "reciprocal" denotes something owed mutually—in this instance, 
discipline owed by one jurisdiction predicated upon that imposed by another. 
The policy reasons for permitting reciprocal discipline are obvious and sound. 
The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings "is to ensure and maintain the high 
standard of professional conduct required of those who undertake the discharge 
of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to protect the public and the 
administration of justice from those who have demonstrated by their conduct that 
they are unable or unlikely to properly discharge their professional 
responsibilities." Rule 1(a), RLDD. Reciprocal discipline is necessary to 
discharge these goals, and does so without the burden and expense of 
independent proceedings. The rule also prevents an attorney who has 
committed professional misconduct resulting in sanction by one jurisdiction from 
avoiding its effects simply by moving to another state. 
By the same token, jurisdictions must be free to impose the discipline that 
would be warranted there. If it were otherwise, the jurisdiction's disciplinary 
powers would be limited by what is deemed appropriate elsewhere. It would 
mean that the consequences for an attorney's serious misconduct elsewhere 
would not necessarily result in the sanction that likely would be imposed were the 
misconduct committed here. Such a result is inconsistent with the RLDD's 
directive that "These rules shall be construed so as to achieve substantial justice 
and fairness in disciplinary matters . . . ." Rule 1(c), RLDD. Indeed, the 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") are designed to promote 
"consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar 
offenses within and among jurisdictions." Rule 1.3, Standards. 
These goals are not furthered by Welker's restrictive interpretation of the 
reciprocal discipline rule. Instead, as Welker would have it, if a respondent 
commits an offense warranting disbarment in Utah, she can nevertheless avoid 
that sanction so long as she is prosecuted first in another jurisdiction and 
receives a lesser discipline there. This approach inadequately protects the 
public, and produces an unfair result for attorneys found to have committed the 
same or similar offenses in Utah. 
II. Utah's Reciprocal Discipline Rule Comports With Due Process 
Requirements 
Utah's reciprocal discipline rule affords respondents an opportunity to 
demonstrate that the procedure in the other jurisdiction "was so lacking in notice 
or opportunity to he heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process." Rule 
22(d)(1), RLDD. This is important because a final adjudication elsewhere 
conclusively establishes the misconduct. Welker did not allege that California's 
procedures deprived him of notice or opportunity to be heard such that it 
amounted to a deprivation of due process. 
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Utah's reciprocal discipline rule provides for notice of the Utah 
proceedings, and gives respondents an opportunity to be heard. Notice that the 
OPC would seek reciprocal discipline was afforded Welker when the OPC filed 
and served upon him its Petition for Reciprocal Discipline. (R. 1-36) The 
language of the rule itself, a copy of which was sent to Welker by the OPC, 
conveys notice that there may be a departure from the discipline imposed 
elsewhere if "the misconduct established warrants substantially different 
discipline in this state or is not misconduct in this jurisdiction." Rule 22(d)(3), 
RLDD. 
In any event, Welker had actual notice that the OPC would seek a more 
severe sanction than what was imposed in California when it stated in its Petition 
served upon Welker that: "The OPC believes and therefore alleges that Welker's 
misconduct warrants substantially different and greater discipline in this State, 
under Utah[ ]'s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions." (R. 1-36 U 10) The 
OPC also filed and served a memorandum demonstrating that disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction in Utah for misconduct of the type committed by Welker. 
(R. 56-65) Welker thus had ample actual notice. 
The rule also provides for an opportunity to be heard: respondents are 
given the right to inform OPC counsel of any claim that the imposition of 
equivalent discipline would be unwarranted, and state the reasons therefor. See 
Rule 22(b), RLDD. The District Court permitted the parties to brief their 
respective positions,1 and Welker was also "heard" in the District Court hearing 
1
 Welker also filed two affidavits of fact (R. 50-53, 74-78) that the District Court 
read and considered in making its decision. (R. 95) 
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the court conducted before deciding this matter. Welker thus had ample 
opportunity to, and did, present his argument that identical discipline was 
appropriate. He presented the argument in a Memorandum (R. 43-46) and in a 
Reply Memorandum (R. 70-73), and through oral argument. Significantly, Welker 
never contended until this matter was on appeal that Utah's reciprocal discipline 
rule is constitutionally flawed for failure to provide him notice that he might 
receive a more severe discipline than that which he received in California. 
III. Welker's Assertion That No Other Respondent In a Reciprocal 
Discipline Proceeding Has Received Increased Discipline Is 
Unsupported and Not Germain to the Disposition of This Case 
Welker's Brief asserts in three places words to the effect that "No lawyer in 
the State of Utah has ever received a more severe penalty in Utah than he or she 
received in another jurisdiction." Brief of Appellee at 5, 4, 1. He offers no factual 
basis for making this assertion. 
The OPC can neither affirm nor dispute Welker's contention, but observes 
that the RLDD were adopted in 1993, and prior to that, disciplinary proceedings 
were conducted by the Ethics and Discipline Committee with review and approval 
by the Bar Commission, and recommendations made to this Court concerning 
sanctions. See Summary, RLDD. The disciplinary proceedings model has 
changed significantly in the last decade, and to date, very few reciprocal 
discipline cases have been brought in District Court and the OPC is not aware of 
any that have been appealed to this Court. Welker's contention therefore could 
not have much foundation in a procedurally similar context. 
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Additionally, Welker offers no case-by-case comparison of reciprocal 
discipline cases that would demonstrate that increased sanctions either were 
warranted but not sought by the OPC, or imposed by the District Court. Welker's 
unsupported assertions therefore lend no support to his argument that he should 
not receive a sanction more harsh than what was imposed in California. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in concluding that Rule 22, RLDD, restricts it to 
imposing identical discipline in a reciprocal discipline case. For purposes of 
reciprocal disciplinary proceedings in this state, "a final adjudication of the other 
court . . . that a respondent has been guilty of misconduct shall establish 
conclusively the misconduct." Welker's many serious instances of professional 
misconduct warrant disbarment under Utah law, and that is the sanction that 
should be imposed. 
DATED: December \^T , 2003. 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Kate A. Toomey 
Deputy Counsel 
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